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Article 2

From Brown to Grutter
Linda S. Greene*
In this essay, I suggest that the doctrinal legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education1 must be assessed against the developments in equal
protection since Brown. In this respect, although I contend that the
Brown decision is one of the most important race decisions ever, its
legacy as a doctrinal marker is an impoverished one. Here, I examine
the core basis of the Brown decision and conclude that although
ambiguous, the decision had great potential.
The belated implementation of Brown, however, and its weak
remedial counterpart, Brown 11,2 severely limited its potential as a
vehicle for school desegregation. By the time that the Supreme Court
demanded that states comply with Brown, many courts were already
holding that Brown did not require integration but merely forbade the
state enforcement of segregation, and coupled with the fact that various3
other theories of constitutional resistance to Brown were emerging.
Moreover, even as the Court articulated justifications for broad relief
designed to produce unitary school districts, the Supreme Court also
began to articulate constitutionally based arguments marking the limits
of Brown.4 Brown's legacy must also be measured by the degree to
which its progeny provided constitutional cover to policies limiting
*

Evjue Bascom Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School

1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
3. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 751-52 (1975) (discussing
Brown, and noting that in Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 776 (1955), Judge Parker held, "It does
not forbid such discrimination as occurs as the result of voluntary action."). In addition, a
majority of the congressmen from eleven southern states signed a document called the Southern
Manifesto, declaring that Brown was an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. Id. at 752. As
late as 1982, Congress considered but did not adopt anti-busing and court jurisdiction legislation
that would have barred school desegregation through pupil integration. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 547-548 (3d ed. 1996).
4. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971)
(cautioning that district courts, while having sweeping equitable powers to create unitary school
districts, would not have authority to adjust remedies in the face of demographic changes, as
proof of deliberate constitutional violation is a prerequisite to the deployment of authorized
remedial measures).
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inclusion and opportunity. Finally, Brown's legacy must be measured
by the extent to which current doctrine fosters and demands policies
promoting racial inclusion and opportunity. In the latter respect, I
contend that the recent affirmative action cases, Grutter v. Bollinger5
and Gratz v. Bollinger6 are the most recent successors to Brown's
legacy. Although these decisions clarify twenty-five years of doubt
about the constitutional legitimacy of voluntary racial inclusion, they do
not revisit or revise the impoverished post-Brown doctrinal landscape.
Nevertheless, Grutter's premises are broad enough to support a
rethinking of the meaning of Brown in the context of schools and
beyond. The revitalization of that potential would be a fitting tribute to
Brown.
Just over a century ago, the Supreme Court upheld racial
segregation
in Plessy v. Ferguson.7 Plessy's hold on the scope of constitutional
equality was tenacious. Plessy was possible because the Court
distinguished an important precedent that arguably might have
mandated a different result. In a prior case, Strauder v. West Virginia,8
the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that excluded
blacks from juries. 9 In Strauder, the Court struck down the statute on
the broad principle that laws inferring that the inferiority of blacks in
civil society were unconstitutional because they were steps backward in
the direction of slavery. 10 In sweeping terms that are necessarily
diminished when paraphrased, the Court spoke categorically about the
constitutionality of racial distinctions:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same
for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or
white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law
because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive
immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race-the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored -exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority
in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
5. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of racially
segregated railroad cars and reaffirming the "separate but equal" doctrine).
8. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
9. Id. at 304.
10. Id. at 307.
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reducing them to the condition of a subject race.11

Urged on by the State of Louisiana, the Court in Plessy distinguished
the question of jury service from passage on intra-state trains, observing
that the framers could not have intended such sweeping application of
the Strauder principles. 12 Moreover, the Court rejected the assertion
that state-mandated segregation imposed a racial stigma on blacks
affected by the law. 13 Shortly thereafter, the Court applied Plessy to an
educational setting where a lesser degree of education was offered to
blacks than was offered to whites.14 These developments set the stage
for over fifty years of constitutionally endorsed segregation and
inequality. 15
Between Plessy and Brown, a series of carefully litigated cases in the
context of higher education exposed the true nature of the "separate-butequal regime."' 16 What the truth revealed was that facilities for blacks
The resulting
were either nonexistent 17 or patently unequal. 18
successful litigation was aimed at instances where states did not make
any provisions for separate education.19 The particular states that were
the early targets of litigation adamantly defended their segregated
institutions.2 0 After the NAACP lawyers bested the states' defenses of

11. Id. at 307-08.
12. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545.
13. Id. at 551 (arguing that if blacks feel inferior, "it is not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it").
14. Cumming v. County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
15. KLUGER, supra note 3, at 169; see generally HORACE MANN BOND, THE EDUCATION OF
THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER (1970) (chronicling the history of the economic
state of the country from Reconstruction through Brown, and explaining how the economic
conditions led to state-sponsored segregation in schools).
16. See generally KLUGER, supra note 3, 195-213, 256-84 (chronicling the law school and
graduate education cases leading up to Brown).
17. See, e.g., Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (1936) (holding that the exclusion of blacks
from the only law school in the state is unconstitutional). See generally GENNA RAE McNEIL,
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 131-43
(1983) (discussing the legal campaign of the NAACP against state funded educational facilities
for whites only).
18. See KLUGER, supra note 3, at 282 (analyzing various cases in which educational facilities
provided to blacks were found to be substantially unequal to those facilities provided to whites).
19. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (concluding that a black
student was deprived of equal protection when forced to receive his education under lesser
conditions than white students); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948)
(ruling that the denial of a black student to the only state law school was in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938) (finding that refusing admission or mandating segregation of classrooms constituted a
denial by the state of the equal protection of the law and was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
20. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641 (holding that Oklahoma's statutes, which mandated
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policies that categorically excluded blacks from law schools, 2 1 the
segregationist strategy morphed into a modified, though arguably more
benign, version of apartheid. The new strategy consisted of two wellchoreographed steps: (1) wait to be sued; and (2) after defeat, ask for
time to establish separate institutions for blacks. 22 This approach was
arguably defensible under Plessy.23 Upon close examination of the
25
24
rather colorful cases of Sipuel v. Oklahoma and Sweatt v. Painter,
arguments for the "equality" of these sham institutions seem silly and
sophomoric. Yet, the history of the Court had been replete with "winks
26
and nods" at the gap between formal equality and substantive equality.
institutions of higher education provide instruction on a segregated basis, deprived the petitioner
of the right to equal protection of the law); Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 633 (reversing and remanding the
district court's and Oklahoma Supreme Court's decisions to deny plaintiff access to a legal
education at a state-sponsored school).
21. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state
from treating its citizens differently based on race); Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352 (holding that
petitioner was entitled to be admitted into the state law school because there was no other place
for him to get legal training in the state).
22. This approach was pioneered at the University of Missouri Law School which lost the
Gaines case in 1938 yet avoided integration for almost two decades by offering legal education at
Lincoln University, a law school established at the state university for blacks. After Sweatt v.
Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950), the University conceded that it could no longer maintain formal
segregation at the University of Missouri Law School. See generally Linda Greene, Gaines: The
Litigation and the Legacy (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
23. KLUGER, supra note 3, at 73-82.
24. Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 631 (reversing the holding of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 180
P.2d 135 (Okla. 1947), which ruled that the state could not be accused of discrimination for
failing to institute a law school for blacks since the black student did not make known her desire
to attend such a school).I contend that these cases are colorful because of the creative
performance of certain southern states in their efforts to evade Plessy's "equal but separate"
command. The cases are filled with material that would provide a brilliant opportunity for an
ambitious production designer.
In the case of Sipuel, after the Supreme Court ordered compliance under the unambiguous
precedent of Gaines ex rel Missouri, the state of Oklahoma responded by creating a caricature of
its state law school. "Oklahoma created a separate law school overnight by ordering a small
section of the State Capitol roped off for colored students and assigning three law teachers to
attend to instruction." KLUGER, supra note 3, at 259--60. The plaintiff Sipuel refused to attend.
Id. Thousands of students and faculty protested the University's decision in 1948. Id. Texas
competed for the absurdity prize. After a court decided that Texas could not maintain one law
school for whites only, initially the state rented a few rooms in Houston, forty miles away from
the black's college, and hired two lawyers to serve on the faculty of the Prairie View Law School.
Id. A Texas court quickly concluded that it was equal to the University of Texas at Austin, even
though it had no student body, no faculty, and no library. Id. Later, Texas established a law
school in downtown Austin in a facility encompassing three basement rooms, three part time
teachers, and a fraction of the volumes available at the University of Texas. Id. at 261. The
adjective colorful might well give way to a more cynical one such as "ludicrous" or "shameful."
25. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that the law school for blacks, which had
no independent faculty or library and lacked accreditation, was not equal to the University of
Texas Law School).
26. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
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Historically, the Court established broad rules that were at once
circumvented via "sub-constitutional rules." 27 In fairness to the states'
lawyers, it was not altogether clear that the Court would actually
acknowledge constitutionally significant differences between the law
school at the University of Texas at Austin, the University of
Oklahoma, and the small, hastily created law schools established to
evade integration. 28 But in time, by virtue of the careful and thorough
litigation of these cases and the evidence presented of the schools'
tangible and intangible inequalities, there was no doubt that the candid
defense of segregated institutions was doomed to fail.29
The rationale of the important pre-Brown cases was broader than the
mere condemnation of racial segregation in the context of physically
unequal facilities. Both McLaurin v. Oklahoma 30 and Sweatt v.
Painter3 1 questioned the assertion that an equal educational experience
might be had within a racially-segregated environment. McLaurin held
that a university could not admit a black student into the graduate
school and thereafter prevent him from having contact with white
students. 32 Thus, McLaurin condemned state imposed intellectual racial
isolation where a black attended school in the same facility as nonblacks. 33 In Sweatt, Texas sought to maintain segregation at the
University of Texas Law School by quickly opening a small, minimally
34
staffed, and scarcely equipped law school for black students.
Declaring that the Separate but Equal Doctrine could not be satisfied
with a sham effort, the Supreme Court explored and exposed the
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 452-58 (2004) (noting that the Justices' refusals to
examine the legislative intent or the discriminatory exercise of administrative discretion made it
possible for whites to continually violate blacks' rights).
27. Id. at 457.
28. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631-34 (noting the disparities between law schools, including
library size, faculty size, and academic facilities).
29. See generally Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 632-33 (holding that the state must provide educational
opportunities in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause, but failing to address how the state
might satisfy such a requirement); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636 (finding that Plessy v. Ferguson did
not need to be reexamined in "light of contemporary knowledge respecting the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of racial segregation").
30. McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (ruling that students of all races must
receive the same treatment to avoid violation of equal protection).
31. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633 (concluding that there was not "substantial equality in the
educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State").
32. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641-42 (arguing that "There is a vast difference-a Constitutional
difference-between restrictions imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual
commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no
such bar.").
33. Id.
34. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

differences in the physical plant, the library, the classrooms and the
budget.3 5 Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of having the opportunity to establish contacts and relationships with
legal professionals while in law school, and indicated that these contacts
36
and relationships were crucial to the successful practice of law.
Therefore, the Sweatt Court condemned Texas for its attempted
complicity in the creation of an unequal bar. 37 Both Sweatt and
McLaurin laid the foundation for Brown's conclusion that separate
educational institutions deprived black students of equal protection by
creating an educational environment that produced a disadvantaging
educational result.
The evidence presented in Brown was multi-faceted. In some of the
cases consolidated for argument before the Court in Brown, there was
patent evidence of tangible inequality. 38
However, the ultimate
question was whether segregation was per se unconstitutional.
The Court concluded that segregation was per se unconstitutional,
quoting the District Court, that "[s]egregation with the sanction of
law ... has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental
development of Negro children and deprive them of some of the
39
benefits they would receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system."
The Court relied on the conclusions of the lower courts both in the
Kansas 40 and Delaware 4 1 cases. In addition, the Court also appears to
have substantially relied on the appellant's brief's appendix, which
contained studies authored by social scientists including Kenneth and
Mamie Clark.42 The Court, moreover, relied on its prior precedents in

35. Id.
36. Id. at 634-35.
37. Id. at 634.
38. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1954) (noting that the district courts in
Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia found that African-American schools were inferior with
respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, and physical conditions).
39. Id. at 494 (stating that a similar finding was made in Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862
(1952)).
40. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp 797, 800 (1953) (finding that segregation in lower
grades is a denial of Due Process, but denying relief due to substantially equal schools for blacks
and whites).
41. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 865 (1952) (concluding that educational segregation
results in blacks "receiving educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those
available to white children otherwise similarly situated").
42. See Appendix to Brief of Appellant, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8)
"The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science
Statement" (detailing the findings of the Clarks studies which used dolls to determine the effects
of segregation on black children), reprinted in PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 166-84 (Kenneth
Clark, ed. 1955).
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McLaurin and Sweatt to reach the conclusion that Plessy must be
overruled.4 3
Although some reduce this aspect of Brown to the raw assertion that
black children cannot learn apart from white children, 44 this
characterization gives short shrift to the full import of Brown's
affirmation of the right of full citizenship for black children. Before the
Court cited this testimony, it spoke of the critical role of education as
perhaps the most important function of state and local government, the
foundation for a democratic society, and a prerequisite for "performance
of our most basic public responsibilities. . . , the very foundation of
good citizenship ...[and] the principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values . . . . "45 Against the backdrop of these concerns,
it was defensible for the Court to have resolved any doubt about the
stigmatizing effect of state sponsored segregation in favor of the
children the state subjected to the practice
without necessarily implying
46
that they felt the stigma was significant.
However, the Court's reliance on the expert testimony and the
importance of education in the 1950s fell far short of ringing
condemnation of educational apartheid. Though path-breaking and
threatening to certain American traditions, the Brown Court failed to
acknowledge the detrimental effects that the judicial approval of public
and school segregation had on the freedoms obtained during
Reconstruction. 4 7 Nor did Brown place school segregation in the larger
context of exclusion of blacks from significant opportunity in
employment, politics, housing, or economic and business affairs.
Brown neither condemned these practices nor set forth any standard for

43. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
44. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (discussing the implications of this
premise of Brown). Justice Thomas expressed his concerns about racial isolation by stating that:
[It] is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is. After all, if separation itself is a
harm, and if integration therefore is the only way that blacks can receive a proper
education, then there must be something inferior about blacks. Under this theory,
segregation injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own, cannot achieve. To
my way of thinking, that conclusion is the result of a jurisprudence based on a theory
of black inferiority.
Id. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring).
45. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
46. The Court could have simply dismissed the legitimacy of Plessy's no-stigma conclusion as
absurd when written. KLUGER, supra note 3, at 705-06. Such an approach would have required
the Court as an institution to admit, if tacitly, complicity in the post-Plessy legacy, but that was
not the path that would lead to the unanimity Chief Justice Warren desired. See id. at 694-99.
47. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489 (refusing to acknowledge that the country had taken measures
to deprive blacks of freedoms obtained during the Reconstruction period).
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48
the evaluation of America's myriad of subordinating structures.
Although the Court did not discuss school segregation in the broader
context of general segregation and racial subordination, it is difficult to
speak candidly about the potential of Brown without placing the
decision in this broader context. The matter of context may be
persuasively illustrated by the brutal lynching of 15-year-old Emmett
49
Till in 1955, for whistling at a white woman just one year after Brown.
This context was further illustrated in the same year by the famous
Montgomery bus boycott, sparked by Rosa Parks's refusal to give up
her bus seat to a white customer.50 In addition, the murders of civil
rights workers 5' and civil rights leaders 52 during the next decade
affirmed the degree of controversy associated with Brown's repudiation
of Plessy. If the pre-Brown civil rights demonstrations, 53 coupled with
the increased number of lynchings after World War 1I54 were not
sufficient proof for the necessity of Brown, then the direct resistance to
the decision, both creative 55 and crass, 56 made it clear that whatever
48. Nonetheless, after Brown, the Court did strike down statutes that mandated racial
segregation in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (declaring
statutes and ordinances requiring segregation on motor buses to be a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause), affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (D. Ala. 1956); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (declaring enforcement of racial segregation of public beach and bathhouses
maintained by public funds to be unconstitutional), affg 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
49. See PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA 422-32 (2002) (discussing the murder of Emmett Till in 1955). Fourteen year-old
Emmett Till, who lived in Chicago and was visiting relatives in Mississippi, accompanied his
friends to a general store. During the brief visit, he spoke to a white woman and may have flirted
with her. Several days later, two men came to the home of the relatives to take Emmett Till
away. After four days, his bloated body was pulled out of the Tallahatchie River. Till's mother
brought his body back to Chicago for an open casket public funeral "so that others could see what
they did to my boy." Id. at 423-25; See also M. MOBLEY AND C. BENSON, DEATH OF
INNOCENCE: THE STORY OF THE HATE CRIME THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2003).
50. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS 128-30 (1988); DAVID GARROW, BEARING
THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE 11-15 (1986).
51. See DRAY, supra note 49, at 446-48 (discussing the murders of Michael Schwerner,
James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman in Mississippi in 1964); GARROW, supra note 50, at 342
(describing the disappearance of an interracial team of movement workers in Philadelphia and the
steps taken to protect Martin Luther King, Jr. during his visit to the city).
52. See DRAY, supra note 49, at 458 (describing the assassinations and lynchings of civil
rights activists); GARROW, supra note 50, at 623-24 (describing the murder of Martin Luther
King, Jr.).
53. See DRAY, supra note 49, at 364-65 (discussing demonstrations and civil rights activity
during World War II).
54. See DRAY, supra note 49, at 369-76 (discussing post-World War II violence and lynching
of black soldiers).
55. Griffin v. Prince Edward Co., 377 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1964) (describing a county school
board's efforts to undermine the desegregation decree by closing public schools and using public
funds to support private segregated schools).
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Brown may have said about dolls and stigma 57 it was-and is-much
less important than Brown's potential to disrupt the racial status quo.
This much seems clear: in Brown, the Court ventured to the precipice of
substantive racial equality.
Moreover, in Brown //,58 the 1955 remedial decision, the Court
retreated from that precipice. Chief Justice Warren entered a Faustian
bargain in return for unanimity-"[a] pledge that the Court
implementation decree would allow segregation to be dismantled
gradually instead of being wrenched apart." 59 The Court invited school
boards and lower courts to balance the rights of black children against
myriad factors that militated against the immediate enforcement of
Brown.6° The Court did repudiate the most blatant examples of
defiance, such as the closing of all public schools in Prince Edward
County, Virginia and the Arkansas governor's deployment of state
troops to block enforcement of Brown.6 1 Nonetheless, more than
twenty years passed before the beginning of meaningful
desegregation. 62 By the time the Court aggressively addressed that
task, 63 "white flight," 64 also known as demographic change, made the
56. Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1958) (describing the actions of the Arkansas
Legislature and Governor to prevent desegregation, which included the Governor sending
National Guard troops to block black students from entering a public high school).
57. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.Il (1954) (relying on the studies
conducted by Kenneth Clark, during which he had shown black and white dolls to children and
asked a series of questions and ultimately concluded that racial segregation had a negative impact
on black children); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting how the Court relied on
the studies of Kenneth & Mamie Clark in deciding Brown).
58. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
59. KLUGER, supra note 3, at 698 (providing Chief Justice Earl Warren's pledge to Justice
Reed).
60. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300-01. "[Tihe courts may consider problems related to
administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation
system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas.. revision of local laws and
regulations ....
."Id. "They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may
propose ....
Id. at 301.
61. Griffin v. Prince Edward Co., 377 U.S. 218, 232-34 (1964) (observing and criticizing
some locales' tactics of avoiding desegregation by closing all district schools); Cooper, 358 U.S.
at 7-13 (discussing gubernatorial defiance and violence). But a close reading of these decisions
suggest that they may focus as much on the impermissibility of defiance of courts as they do on
the repudiation of constitutional rights.
62. See generally James R. Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 42-44 (1967) (discussing the beginnings of desegregation).
63. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25-32 (1971)
(authorizing various remedies to comply with desegregation decrees including the use of
minority-to-majority student ratios, attendance rezoning and minority-majority school transfer
provisions); Green v. Co. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-42 (1968) (attacking school board's choice
of school desegregation program for failing to satisfactorily comply with desegregation
requirements of creating a non-race based admission program and ordering school board to revise
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command of integration an empty mandate in some contexts. 65 In the
context of these decisions, the Court signaled the limitation of Brown's
language of opportunity and inclusion. 66 Over the next few years, the
Court imposed limitations on the lower courts. Specifically, the lower
courts were forbidden to order remedies addressing lagging black
academic achievement, unless proof was offered that any deficits were
traceable to past de jure segregation. 67 This was the case despite
evidence that what is labeled de facto segregation may be the product of
myriad decisions including zoning, highway placement, and
68
infrastructure.
These limiting developments, coupled with the Court's willingness to
69
authorize withdrawal of judicial supervision in whole or in part,
its plan immediately).
64. See generally GARY ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS:
CHANGING PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968 7-8 (1993) (showing a
decreasing percentage of white students in schools attended by typically black or Latino students
during the years 1970-1991); ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY
RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 146
(Aug.
8,
2002),
available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Race-in-AmericanPublicSchools.pdf
[hereinafter FRANKENBERG & LEE] (explaining the growing trend of white isolation from
predominantly minority populated schools due to the small amount of whites living in those
districts).
65. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717, 745-46 (1974) (refusing to enforce interdistrict desegregation remedies where de jure segregation, in violation of the desegregation
decree, only occurred in a single district).
66. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32 (limiting the scope of desegregation remedies to correct
present or past official actions causing segregation and holding that "[n]either the school
authorities nor the district court are constitutionally required to make year-to-year adjustments of
the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been
accomplished").
67. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 96 (1995) (stating that segregation that is a concern
of the law must have a causal link to the de jure violation of the desegregation decree); Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (noting that for a desegregation remedy not to exceed the
violation it must be tailored to cure de jure segregation); Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, 32 (noting limits
to the court's authority to enforce desegregation to instances where a constitutional violation by
the school district or other agency of the state deliberately causes racial segregation). "De facto
segregation" is defined as segregation that occurs without state authority, usually based on
socioeconomic factors. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1362 (7th ed. 1999). "De jure segregation"
is segregation that is permitted by law. Id.
68. Anne Randall, Note, Reclaiming Brown's Vision: A New Constitutional Frameworkfor
Mandating School Integration, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 363, 374-78 (2003).
69. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (allowing courts to "relinquish
supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been
achieved"); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (determining school desegregation
injunctions "are not intended to operate in perpetuity"); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976) (holding that once a school board implements a racially neutral
attendance pattern in order to comply with a court order, the court is not entitled to require the
school board to ensure a racial mix in perpetuity).
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diminished the full potential of Brown by leaving untouched the issue of
educational disadvantages disproportionately experienced by black
children.70 These limitations of remedies dating back to nineteenth
century state action doctrine, 7 1 with its accompanying distinctions
72
between de jure and de facto racial discrimination, have effectively
limited Brown's transformative potential in the context of school
desegregation.
But the meaning of Brown should not be cabined by the context of
desegregation. Returning to its full citizenship dimensions, Brown
suggests that full equality should be measured by the extent to which
the state provides children the necessary tools for the attainment of full
citizenship. Just as the Court in Brown refused to determine the
meaning of education with reference to nineteenth century standards, so
too must Courts-and school boards-measure satisfying the demands
of equal protection in twenty-first century terms. Whether measured by
73 Brown
disproportionate drop out rates or college matriculation,
requires an evaluation of the effects of educational practices on black
74 It is
children, including racial segregation and isolation of students.
70. See Diane Rado, Darnell Little & Grace Aduroja, Still Separate, Unequal, CHI. TRIB.,
May 9, 2004, at I (describing under-funding of minority schools in Illinois).
71. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (stating the Fourteenth Amendment
"does not invest congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of
state legislation"); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637-39 (1883) (expounding that when a
state has not violated any state law and state law recognizes and protects the rights of persons, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress power to impose its own laws); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (explaining that the states possess their own sovereign
powers-those powers which are not granted to the federal government in the Constitution -and
thus are allowed to take their own remedial actions for legal violations so long as it is within the
scope of their powers).
72. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310-12 (1879) (authorizing these distinctions
between de facto and de jure discrimination). In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), the
Court refused to acknowledge the potential of "race neutral" rules to nullify constitutional
protections. This doctrine was readopted in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
There, the Court noted that is not necessary for a
discriminatory racial purpose... [to] be express or appear on the face of the statute, or
that a law's disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based
claims of racial discrimination. A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be
applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.
also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 352 n. 5 (1987) (discussing permissible race
See
Id.
neutral selection criteria).
73. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, LOSING
OUR FUTURE: How MINORITY CHILDREN ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE
CRISIS 7-10 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/dropouts/dropouts04.php [hereinafter LOSING OUR FUTURE] (discussing more effective
statistical methods of tracking high school drop-out and graduation rates among minorities).
74. See FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 64, at 22.
The isolation of blacks and Latinos has serious ramifications; this isolation is highly
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not too late to reread Brown as a decision that establishes an equal
protection right to an equally effective education. In fact, Grutter's
75
endorsement of educational diversity on quality of education grounds
may reopen the debate about whether race, wealth, and other factors
may be taken into account in creating environments that foster, rather
than retard, success. Such a reading of Brown would invite the
application of Brown's concerns to twenty-first century conditions
without assumptions about the disability of non-white and white
students, without assumptions about the per se utility of integration, and
without assumptions about the per se undesirability of single-race
schools.
Beyond education, Brown's force as a principle empowering the
racial transformation of America may also measure the case's long-term
significance. In this regard, it is fair to note Brown's symbolic value in
shoring up the legitimacy of political efforts to regain federal protection
of civil rights lost following the collapse of Reconstruction.7 6 The
empowerment of the 1950s and 1960s civil rights movement, in turn,
led to congressional passage of federal civil rights laws.77 These
statutes provide a foundation for equal opportunity in many contexts
including housing, employment, public accommodations, and
education. Brown laid the foundation for these advancements.
Ultimately, the key post-Brown question was whether the Court
correlated with poverty, which is often strongly related to striking inequalities in test
scores, graduation rates, courses offered and college going rates. Virtually no attention
is being paid to this troubling pattern in the current discussion of educational
reform ....
Id.
75. In this respect, Justice O'Connor concluded that it was appropriate to defer to the
academic judgments of universities as to whether diversity was necessary for the operation of
their institutions. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). Justice O'Connor's Grutter
opinion agreed that the law school and its amici had substantiated the educational benefits of
diversity. Id. at 328-30. Diversity, Justice O'Connor agreed, contributed to the breakdown of
stereotypes as well as to a livelier and more interesting classroom discussion. Id. at 330.
76. See BRANCH, supra note 50, at 124 (observing that the "Brown case had brought fresh
excitement to the NAACP"); Id. at 217 (noting that the Brown third anniversary was the occasion
for the May 17, 1957 Lincoln Memorial Prayer Pilgrimage seeking voting rights); Id. at 285
(stating that the Brown decision inspired civil rights leaders Wyatt Tee Walker and Vernon
Johns); GARROW, supra note 50, at 59 (pointing out the Brown decision encouraged Montgomery
Alabama activists and civil rights lawyers to challenge the segregated bus system).
77. See Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2000) (prohibiting
discrimination in public accommodations); Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(d) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance);
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment); The 1965 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2002) (prohibiting discrimination
in voting); The 1968 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606 (2000) (prohibiting
discrimination in sale, rental, lease, and financing of housing).
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would extend Brown to condemn all racial segregation and exclusion
from opportunity. Although Brown focused on the effect of segregation
in the context of education, its principles are broad enough to support a
constitutional principle of full and equal citizenship, and repudiate the
78
limited vision of national citizenship contained in Slaughter-House. If
fully implemented, opportunity and inclusion would become
fundamental American constitutional values. Brown was rapidly
extended to other contexts in which policies of racial exclusion were
overt and blatant.
In this post-Brown phase of constitutional history, the question was
once again-and predictably so-framed in terms of distinctions
between de jure segregation and exclusion on the one hand, and de facto
segregation and exclusion on the other. As in the nineteenth century,
the twentieth century Court decided that de facto segregation was
beyond the reach of judicial correction. After Brown, and beyond the
context of school segregation, the Supreme Court considered whether
policies with disproportionate negative effects on minorities should be
strictly scrutinized for their validity and necessity. For example, in
Washington v. Davis,79 the precise question was whether the Court
should strictly scrutinize procedures and/or criteria that
disproportionately disqualified minorities from jobs. In that case, the
Court decided that no such scrutiny was required unless minorities
could prove that the procedures or criteria were adopted with the intent
of excluding blacks. 80 As a result, post-Brown constitutional equality
principles operated as a weak weapon against disadvantages produced
by a four-century legacy of American slavery. Furthermore, in an
extension of Washington, the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp declined to
strictly scrutinize Georgia's death penalty system, which resulted in
more death sentences for blacks than for whites. 81 In language that
remains puzzling, the Court required that the death-sentenced inmate
demonstrate that Georgia adopted the 82death penalty system "because of
its effects" not "in spite of its effects."
The Washington-McCleskey rule severely limits the realization of
Brown's promise of full citizenship. Washington-McCleskey restricts
78. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1872).
79. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
80. Id. at 242.
81. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987) (finding a legitimate reason for the
Georgia legislature to adopt a specific law).
82. Id. at 298 (suggesting that a disproportionate impact of an act upon one racial group over
another, without a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the decision maker, is not alone
sufficient to qualify as an equal protection violation).
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the scope of equal protection claims as well as increases the costs and
risks of litigating those claims. In the absence of a vigorous
constitutional principle that casts doubt on practices that perpetuate the
past segregation and discrimination, rules and practices that produce
these outcomes, even if not squarely endorsed, acquire a gloss of
constitutional legitimacy. In this legal environment, constitutional
doctrine immunizes from judicial inquiry the cumulative effects of
private and public decision-making, as well as the influence of wealth
and poverty. As a result, the opportunity and inclusion aspirations of
minorities are delegitimized. On the contrary, if constitutional doctrine
condemned, or at a minimum rendered suspicious facially-neutral rules
with disproportionate disadvantageous effects, the gloss of meritocracy
that shores up these disparities would be undermined.
Typically, the legacy of Brown has been linked to the controversy
over the constitutionality of race-conscious programs of inclusion, also
known as affirmative action, and more derisively, as preferential
treatment. The consequences of the Washington-McCleskey rule
provide constitutional cover to the status quo, lending legitimacy to
policies that disproportionately and cumulatively disadvantage minority
groups, especially the poor. The immunization of race-neutral policies
from constitutional challenges lends credence to the assumption that the
racial and economic stratification of society should be attributed to the
failures of the disadvantaged rather than the unfairness of societal
institutions and rules. In turn, the constitutional legitimacy of policies
resulting in substantial exclusion of minorities lend weight and credence
to the charges that programs of inclusion involve special treatment for
allegedly less qualified individuals. In this constitutional environment,
the rhetoric of "special treatment" is a new stigma that exacerbates the
results of the inequities left standing by weak constitutional equality
principles. Coupled with the charge that those who have historically
enjoyed exclusive entitlement and privilege are now innocent victims of
invidious discrimination, this rhetoric is the new, post-Brown iteration
of the classic and historic charge of minority inferiority, a charge
83
traceable to Dred Scott.
The full scope of status quo protection is not evident until the passive
indifference of Washington-McCleskey, justified by concerns about
inappropriate judicial activism and judicial role, 84 is compared to the
83. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
84. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 ("It is not the responsibility-or indeed even the right-of
this Court to determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes."); Washington, 426 U.S.
at 245-46 ("We [the court] have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral
qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and 'denies any
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rule authorizing aggressive oversight of voluntary programs of
inclusion. After Bakke, 85 in which the Court could not agree on a
standard of review for voluntary programs, almost twenty years elapsed
8 6 In
before the Court settled on a rigorous strict scrutiny standard.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,87 the Court adopted an activist
posture vis-,i-vis programs of racial inclusion, concluding that judicial
skepticism was appropriate whenever race was utilized to accomplish
governmental aims. 88 By doing so, the Court increased the risks
associated with voluntary programs. The more strict and rigorous the
standard, the more legal risk institutions assume when they undertake
voluntary programs of racial inclusion. Given these risks, de facto
exclusion is more likely to thrive because voluntary efforts are
expensive to defend. Simultaneously, de facto exclusion is also resilient
due to the limitations of the Washington-McCleskley rule.
After Adarand, the key question was whether government interests
might justify race as a factor in the university admissions. The Supreme
Court addressed this question last term in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz
v. Bollinger.89 In Grutter, six members of the Court clearly embraced
educational diversity as a compelling interest, 90 and a close reading of
the case suggests that one additional Justice may have also acquiesced
in this view. 9 1 But what does diversity mean? Is the meaning of
person ... equal protection of the laws' simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to
qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.").
85. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 US. 265 (1978).
86. Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (eliciting no standard to which a majority adhered) with
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny for
state and local programs); and Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990) (applying
mid-level scrutiny for federal programs), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515
U.S. 200 (1995); and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny for state and federal programs).
87. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200.
88. Id. at 227-28.
89. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
90. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25 (holding that the Law School's interest in diversity constitutes
a compelling state interest); Id. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (accepting racial diversity as a
compelling interest which furthers the educational task but disagreeing with the Court's
application of strict scrutiny).
91. Chief Justice Rehnquist may have embraced diversity as a compelling interest, although
he did not do so explicitly in Gratz or Grutter. Rather, Rehnquist did not challenge the legitimacy
of diversity as an interest in his dissent. Id. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Nor did he
join the opinion of Justices Thomas or Scalia, both of whom categorically rejected educational
diversity as a compelling interest. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 350 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In contrast, the Chief Justice joined Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, where she argued that limiting compelling interests to identifiable institutional
discrimination on the ground that other interests such as diversity and societal discrimination and
role models were "too amorphous" to limit the use of race. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 612
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diversity broad enough to authorize efforts that might begin to address
the 350-year legacy of exclusion and segregation? Was the Grutter
decision's embrace of diversity broad enough to resurrect Brown's
promise of opportunity and inclusion?
Although Justice O'Connor does not specifically embrace the
elimination of societal discrimination as a justification for the
University of Michigan programs, 92 her Grutter opinion recognized the
extent to which race matters, implicitly infusing the interest of diversity
with remedial content. Justice O'Connor stated, "Ulust as growing up
in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is
likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in
which race unfortunately still matters." 93 The Court also approved
Michigan's interest in a non-token inclusion, accepting Michigan's
argument that the opportunity for meaningful individuality and
94
participation required a critical mass of minorities.
Justice Ginsburg strengthened the link between the end of racial
discrimination and the compelling interest of diversity. 95 For Justice
Ginsburg, the diversity rationale was more than a means to the
important goals of a diverse law school environment and a diverse legal
profession. Her recognition of diversity as a compelling interest was
also grounded in the objective of the elimination of past discrimination.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor's opinion developed another theme,
the interest of institutional regime legitimacy-an interest in the
legitimacy of authoritative structures. In this respect, she linked the
legitimacy of leadership structures to the opportunity of minorities to
96
participate as both peers and authority figures in society's institutions.
O'Connor spoke of the importance of "cultivat[ing] a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry," stating that "it is necessary that
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. Such a statement would be clearly inconsistent with her prior opinions. See, e.g., Metro
Broad., 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that limiting compelling interests to
identifiable institutional discrimination on the ground that other interests such as diversity and
societal discrimination and role models were "too amorphous" to limit the use of race).
93. Grutter,539 U.S. at 333.
94. Id.
95. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The stain of
generations of racial oppression is still visible in our society, and the determination to hasten its
removal remains vital."); Id. at 305 n. 11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In my view, the constitution,
properly interpreted, permits government officials to respond openly to the continuing importance
of race .... "); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("It is well documented that
conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remains alive in our
land impeding realization of our highest values and ideals.").
96. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33.
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the path of leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity." 97 This language not only links
diversity to institutional legitimacy, but also suggests that a diverse
cadre of leadership role models is an important factor in the
development of respect for all citizens within every institution. Grutter
clearly conferred constitutional legitimacy on the principle that nontoken integration of a law school's environment is a compelling interest.
Grutter was decided without any proof that Michigan had intentionally
or consciously excluded blacks and other minorities from its law school.
However, Grutter is only relevant where law schools voluntarily decide
to pursue programs of racial inclusion, making the holding a limited
one.
Moreover, the Court's precedents still confer constitutional
legitimacy on race-neutral rules without regard to their impact on
opportunity, even under circumstances where it is entirely predictable
that racial inclusion will be lost in the pursuit of so-called race-neutral
rules. Though important, Grutter was decided without a re-examination
of these aspects of constitutional doctrine. The fact that the Court
decided Grutter without a re-examination of equal protection speaks
volumes about the Court's deep ambivalence concerning a
transformative role of the Equal Protection Clause. Examined closely,
Grutter also reveals the Court's ambivalence over the project of
Grutter sanctions voluntary
constitutionally mandated equality.
inclusion efforts but requires all such efforts to run the expensive
gauntlet of strict scrutiny and its inevitable accompanying litigation. At
the same time, no constitutionally mandated restructuring of opportunity
is possible without an equally onerous burden of intentional
discrimination.
Read narrowly, Grutter encourages, but does not require, minority
inclusion in the nation's elite public universities. Grutter also does not
require that law schools or other public universities eliminate the de
facto segregation that may result from the usual and customary
admissions criteria, nor does Grutter require that these institutions
rethink their policies to provide greater opportunity to minorities.
Moreover, Grutter does not condemn the narrow conceptions of merit
that produce segregated educational institutions.
Nevertheless, Grutter suggests an opportunity to link the doctrine
governing the constitutionality of programs of inclusion to Brown's
impoverished legacy both within and without education. Grutter's
linkage of the diversity rationale to the elimination of past and current
97.

Id. at 332.
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discrimination with respect to opportunity, citizenship, power, and
leaderships suggests powerful themes that have been absent from equal
protection jurisprudence.
A broader reading of Grutter is also possible. The University of
Michigan successfully urged the Court to consider Grutter's
implications for Brown's legacy. The Grutter opinion draws on the
civic and citizenship dimensions of constitutional equality articulated in
McLaurin, Sweatt, and Brown. Grutter links these citizenship
dimensions to the Court's approval of racial inclusion policies in law
schools and in undergraduate programs of the university. 98 Justice
O'Connor reminds us that the fabric of education is important to the
fabric of society because it fosters the promotion of citizenship and it
99
furthers "the dream of one [indivisible] Nation."
Grutter's focus on opportunity is at odds with the search for de jure
violations that limited the force of Brown. In respect of violation as
well as remedy, the question of whether minority children receive an
effective education has been subordinated to the questions of whether
de jure violations exist or whether existing segregation is traceable to
state action. Grutter's concerns are broader and inexorably closer to the
core of Brown's rationale. Specifically, Grutter supports the rationale
that minority children must have an equal educational opportunity if
they are to be effective participants in American society.
Grutter also invites a different view of the scope of post-Brown
remedies in the context of segregated and re-segregated schools. In the
current violation and remediation framework, the conclusion that
private decisions have led to segregation ends the equal protection
inquiry. However, Grutter's focus on opportunity and inclusion
suggests that we rethink our limited approach to the identification of
constitutional violations. The notion that de jure segregation is the sole
post-Brown violation of equal protection does not go far enough to meet
the sprit of opportunity and inclusion that underlie both Brown and
Grutter. Instead, we must measure the achievement of constitutional
equality by an examination of all measures relevant to educational
achievement. If contemporary benchmarks of what it means to have
equality are to be meaningful, then racial disparities in test scores,
dropout rates, and progress in courses of study, such as reading,

98. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (holding that "[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity").
99. Id.
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mathematics, and writing achievement should also be addressed. 1°° If
the objective of diversity may be considered a compelling interest in
both the college and professional school context under Grutter,
arguably a broader array of interests may be addressed in primary and
secondary education. In some contexts, researchers may demonstrate
that great racial and ethnic diversity may contribute to better
achievement, or that at-risk children, who are disproportionately
minority, require an environment less dominated by at-risk children. In
any event, the assertion that Grutter's deference to the educational
judgments of universities ought to be extended to circumstances where
districts argue that the pursuit of diversity or other policies may enhance
educational outcomes for black and minority students, as well other
students. For those who remain unsure about the stigmatic implications
of arguments for integration per se, Grutter may make possible more
palatable arguments for integration that emphasize benefits for all
students, an argument far removed from the proposition that only
minority students stand to benefit when racial isolation is decreased.
Grutter suggests a departure from the emphasis on segregation and its
causes, and a move towards educational outcomes as the measure of
Brown's satisfaction.
Moreover, where there are differentials in
achievement, the language of Grutter should signal the rejection of any
constitutional equality standard that immunizes this result from
constitutional scrutiny. The Court has signaled its approval of a wide
range of efforts to close the achievement gaps including efforts that
specifically target the concerns of racial minorities. It would be ironic if
the goal of creating a bright future for minority children could not find
shelter under a post-Brown interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision, it is
100. See LOSING OUR FUTURE, supra note 73, at 2 (showing substantially lower high school
graduation rates nationwide among blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans as compared with
whites). Minority children who have more risk factors for lower achievement (such as another
without a high school education or a single parent household) perform less well in reading and
mathematics skills than other children without risk factors. Nearly three quarters of entering
kindergartners from black families have one or more risk factors as compared to whites. The
proportion of children with two or more risk factors is four times larger among blacks than
whites. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, THE CONDITION

OF EDUCATION xxix-xxxvi (May 31,
2001), available a t http://nces.ed.gov/
pubsearch/pubinfo.asp?pubid=2001072.
Reading scores of blacks lag behind whites at the third, fourth, and eighth grade level. Id. at
119-21. Black writing performance also lags behind whites at grades four, eight, and twelve. Id.
Mathematics performance also lagged behind whites at grades four and eight. Id. at 22. Black
children also had smaller gains in reading and mathematics than white children, and the
achievement gap widened from the start of first grade to the end of the third grade. Id. at 123-25.
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fitting that celebrations ensue, for Brown was a powerful break with
America's apartheid past and its importance is not merely symbolic.
Yet, the Court has limited the legacy of Brown by focusing on questions
of causation and intent within and without the school context. The
argument that the government must be held responsible for equal
educational outcomes is a strong one. This is more so the case in a
society that now places greater importance on education than when
Brown was decided. If the full citizenship underpinnings of Brown are
linked to the lofty ideals of Grutter, the Court might craft a vision of
equality robust enough for an increasingly diverse America. Grutter
should prompt us to rethink passive approaches to constitutional
equality that make broad minority participation in every aspect of our
institutions an optional endeavor. Read broadly, Grutter encourages us
to undertake the unfinished inclusionary work of Brown.

